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Tort 2017

Tort 2017

For wheat, melt the chocolate with the butter. Let cool. Mix the egg whites with the sugar. Separately, mix the yolks with the salt powder. Over the yolks, add the melted chocolate with the butter, then the flour mixed with the baking powder. Gradually add the egg whites. We pour the composition in a detachable tray (27 cm) in which we put baking paper and put it in the hot oven. We do the test with the toothpick to check the baking. Remove the top on a grill and let it cool. After it has cooled, cut the top in three.

For Milk cream, put the sugar and starch in a saucepan. We mix them with a whisk, adding little by little milk, until we finish all the milk. Put the bowl on the fire, stirring constantly so that it does not form lumps, until the cream thickens. Put the pot on the fire and add the broken white chocolate. Stir vigorously until all the chocolate is incorporated. After the cream has cooled, mix it with 200 ml whipped cream. Gradually add whipped cream to the cream.

For syrup, put the sugar in a bowl and leave it on the fire until it melts, then add water and let it boil until the sugar melts.

For fruit jelly, put on the fire the frozen fruits together with the sugar and let it boil for a while. I chose to pass them. I put them in the blender, then I added the gelatin prepared according to the instructions on the envelope.

For chocolate bar, I melted the milk chocolate with 2-3 tablespoons of oil, I cut 3 strips of baking paper, I spread the chocolate with them on the brush, I put them in the freezer for 2-3 minutes, then I glued them on the edges of the cake and I introduced the cold cake until the 2nd day when I detached the baking paper from the strips, the chocolate remaining glued to the cake.

For chocolate cream, I mixed 100 g of whipped cream and then mixed with finetti.

I made the figures from melted white chocolate with oil.

To assemble the cake, I placed the first syrupy top, milk cream, then the top 2 syrupy, milk cream and the last syrupy top. I glued the chocolate strips on the edges of the cake, put the detachable ring, the fruit jelly on top and put it in the cold overnight.

In the morning, I removed the strips of baking paper from the edges of the cake, garnished it with chocolate cream and chocolate figures.



Lemon and strawberry jelly flavored keto cheesecake

For this weekend we decided to prepare an aromatic summer cake, with incredibles that do not affect our diet and healthy lifestyle. Ingredients for the countertop: 150g almond flour 50g butter an egg 10g cocoa Sweetener to taste Half a teaspoon baking powder Ingredients for jelly: 300g strawberries (we have & hellip Continue reading Cheesecake keto with lemon flavor and strawberry jelly & rarr


  • for a shape 26 cm in diameter
  • 6 eggs
  • 200 g sugar
  • 100 g flour
  • 50 g cornstarch
  • 40 g cocoa
  • a pinch of salt
  • flavor of your choice

Separate the eggs and mix the egg whites with a pinch of salt until you get a thick foam. Then add the sugar, mixing little by little continuously.

The meringue obtained must be dense and glossy.

Then incorporate the yolks mixed beforehand with the aroma you have chosen and mix gently with a spatula, from top to bottom.

Finally, add the sifted flour, mixed with cocoa and starch.

Cover a cake tin (26 cm in diameter) with baking paper and transfer the resulting composition. Bake the countertop for 30-35 minutes at 170 ° C, until it passes the toothpick test.

*If you want a cake top with cocoa and higher starch, you can bake it in a 24 cm shape.

After baking, take it out on a grill and let it cool completely.

Then you can cut it into three countertops.

*Made the day before assembling the cake, it will cut much better.

Use it with confidence in your favorite cake. Good appetite!

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Ovo-lacto-vegetarian recipes

Ovo-lacto-vegetarian recipes. Simple and easy to make recipes. Meat-free recipes. Recipes containing milk, eggs, cheese.

This collection of recipes is like an online cookbook. It is updated every time a new recipe published on the blog falls into this category.

In the collection you will find recipes for appetizers, basic dishes, desserts such as cakes, cakes or desserts by the glass.

Some of the recipes can easily fall into the category of gluten-free recipes or can be adapted to be helpful in different diets.

I hope you like this generous collection in which most recipes, I must admit, are under the category of "desserts", ie more cakes and pies.

These are generally easy dessert recipes for beginners and are explained step by step.

I hope you like this collection which has been my work for almost 8 years and which I hope to see materialized soon in a cookbook in electronic and physical format.

In order to be able to read each recipe separately, you have to click on the picture of the recipe that interests you or on its title. You will be redirected to another page on the blog where you can read the recipe in detail, with the list of ingredients and how to prepare it.

If you try the recipes, it would be helpful for me to leave a feedback with a comment on that recipe. It would also help to tell me what other recipes like this would interest you.


Light Cake Recipes

Today the cakes are bright colors or all colors, by different flavors or combinations of flavors, sizes big or size sMALL, with stones, pearl, little flowers or other decorative elements, round or rectangular, with one or more storeys, worked in fondant, marzipan, with whipped cream or Chocolate of all colors and all require skill and a lot of talent.

The days of cakes simply decorated with whipped cream are not over, but they have evolved. The cake has long ceased to be just a dessert. Now we are talking about trend, and they focus on large cakes, bright colors, decorations. There are no design limits, flavors or combinations of flavors, it all depends on our imagination and the skill or skill of the confectioner.

If you want to experiment you will not be afraid to try a cake recipe, but keep in mind the following tips: choose a quick recipe and light, use fresh fruits and of season, prepared creams in contrasting combinations, mix the ingredients homogeneously, bake at the indicated temperature, syrup with a suitable aroma, decorated with passion and imagination, leave to cool and SERVE WITH DESIRE!

We have chosen some easy cake recipes, you can experiment and taste what you want.


Vegan coconut cake and chocolate

Last week I showed you how to make a fabulous chocolate and coconut cream. I combined it with the coconut cakes in the sweet version and a cake went crazy. You wouldn't say it doesn't contain it at all no eggs, no dairy. I will definitely do it again, and not again!
I recommend using one kitchen scales, the proportions are important to obtain a dough that allows the modeling of cakes. These may seem more difficult to accomplish, but once you get your hands on them, I assure you it becomes a simple and quick process. For spreading the dough, silicone mats they are more convenient to use than baking paper. Find it at Lidl, in regular offers, or here. If you don't have one, the baking paper is ok.
The best price for coconut flour can be found on Driedfruits.ro. From there, I regularly supply myself with almond flour, coconut, coconut oil, various seeds.

For a cake with a diameter of 16 cm, divided into 6-8 slices

  • for countertops:
  • 90 g coconut flour
  • 22 g psyllium bran
  • a pinch of salt
  • 30 g Green Sugar Premium (or 60 g Classic Green Sugar)
  • 450 ml of hot water for frying
  • for cream:
  • 400 ml coconut cream
  • 100 g dark chocolate (with a minimum of 85% cocoa)
  • sweetener, optional and to taste

First, prepare the cream. Melt the chocolate in the coconut cream, add sweetener, if necessary (I did not put) and mix well. A fairly thick cream comes out, which is left to cool while we take care of the cakes.

Mix all the dry components in a bowl.

Pour over them the hot water in which the sweetener has dissolved, mix quickly with a spatula, until the formation of a dough of plasticine consistency. Leave for about 10-15 minutes, to swell the bran and cool the dough.

Divide the dough into 6 equal parts.

Each piece is stretched with the twister between 2 silicone mats or baking paper greased with a little coconut oil, until the diameter of 16-17 cm is obtained.

Remove the mat (paper) from above, cut a circle with a pot lid. The leftovers are kept, from them at the end the 7th cake will be spread.

Turn the cake over on one hand, remove the other mat (paper), then carefully transfer the cake to a hot pan, greased with a little coconut oil. Bake until golden brown (about 2-4 minutes), over medium to low heat. Using a thin and necessarily wide palette, carefully turn the cake on the other side, keep 1-2 minutes until browned.

Remove the cakes on a towel on a grill to avoid condensation as much as possible. Leave to cool.
When the cakes have cooled, grease them with cream and place them on top of each other.

Let the cake cool for 2 hours, then it can be served. Sprinkle with coconut flakes, ground walnuts or grated dark chocolate.

TOTAL: 1142 grams, 2626.1 calories, 27.8 protein, 240.8 lipids, 34 carbohydrates, 50 fiber
Source: http://calorii.oneden.com

Note: These calculations are approximate. If you follow a strict diet, I recommend you do your own calculations, starting from the concrete products used.


What Should Tort Law Do When Autonomous Vehicles Crash?

This week it was announced that the 2018 Subaru Crosstrek will continue to be made available with a manual transmission. Each year we “save the manuals” folks cringe as the drip, drip, drip of models no longer featuring stick shifts is announced. Each preservation of driver control of gear selection, such as that of the ’18 Crosstrek, is a ray of hope.

It seems that the overwhelming majority of American motorists seem to prefer automatic transmissions, which is, of course, a form of self-driving. For in the hoopla attending the announcement of cars that park, steer and stop themselves, it is easy to forget that most already own cars that shift themselves. In other words, there’s a gradation of self-driving cars. From automatic transmission to cruise control, to automatic headlights that illuminate when natural light dims, to anti-lock brakes that “self-pump” in low-traction situations, to stability control that actuates both accelerator and brakes when the vehicle approaches limits of adhesion , to lane departure correction systems that put you back on track when you drift across a divider line, to collision avoidance systems that brake automatically to avoid hitting an immobile object, to automated parallel (or perpendicular, or angular) parking systems, each year more and more drivers purchase vehicles that accomplish for them a task heretofore incumbent on the driver herself. Indeed, back in prehistoric times when I got my first driver’s license, changing a tire was part of my driver’s test! Today many tires can travel fifty miles with no air pressure: soon changing a flat tire will be yet another task motorists just won’t have to accomplish.

SAN FRANCISCO, CA - MARCH 28: An Uber self-driving car drives down 5th Street on March 28, 2017 in. [+] San Francisco, California. Cars in Uber’s self-driving cars are back on the roads after the program was temporarily halted following a crash in Tempe, Arizona on Friday. (Photo by Justin Sullivan / Getty Images)

And this trend is continuing. There’s little risk of encountering Christine (a Plymouth Fury killer with a mind of her own), but Teslas are upgraded automatically and even repaired at night while their owners sleep. The 2014 BMW X5 with the Traffic Jam® option can drive itself up to 25 miles per hour so long as the “custodian” keeps a hand on the steering wheel. The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) has developed standard classifications of self-drivers: we’re currently testing Levels 2-3 on public roads, but are working on Levels 4 and 5 on private courses:

  • Level 0: Automated system controls nothing, but may issue warnings (e.g., blind spot monitor).
  • Level 1: Automated system includes features such as Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) (slowing the car automatically to match the speed of forward traffic), Parking Assistance with automated steering, and lane departure correction systems. Driver must be ready and able to take control at any time.
  • Level 2: Automated system executes all accelerating, braking, and steering. It can deactivate immediately upon takeover by the driver. The driver is obliged to be alert to objects and events and to respond if the automated system fails to respond properly.
  • Level 3: Like level 2, but within limited environments (such as freeways) the driver can safely turn her attention away from driving tasks, though she must still be prepared to take control when needed.
  • Level 4: Like level 3, but no driver attention is required. Outside the limited environment the vehicle will enter a safe fallback mode - i.e. park the car - if the driver does not retake control.
  • Level 5: Other than setting the destination and starting the system, no human intervention is required. The automatic system can drive to any location where it is legal to drive and make its own decisions.

Alphabet (Google’s parent), Tesla and Uber are testing vehicles that provide levels 3 through 5 of automation. Though the machines are sometimes capable of full Level 5 automation, when driven on public roads legislation in the several states that explicitly allow for their testing requires at least one person to be on board to monitor the vehicle's proper operation and to take over if and when. needed. The testing is progressing apace (notwithstanding a heated legal dispute between Alphabet and Uber about allegedly stolen trade secrets).

The potential safety benefits are tremendous. Self-driving cars don’t rubberneck or drive while drunk. They don’t talk on cell phones or turn their heads to comfort screaming children in the back seat. A convoy of them can accelerate from a stop light simultaneously and maintain very short distances between vehicles, greatly increasing the load capacity of roads and substantially shortening commutes. One prominent study predicted an eventual 90% reduction in collisions, saving tens of thousands of lives and hundreds of billions of dollars in losses in the United States alone.

Of course driving may become boring and tedious for “save the manual” troglodytes like me so I don’t welcome this technological progress with undiluted enthusiasm. But my concern today is with a different problem. What happens when harm is CAUSED by the new technology? For sure, many accidents involving autonomous vehicles will be the fault of “the other guy” (see what happened last week in Tempe, Arizona). But on occasion the autonomous vehicle itself will most assuredly take the rap. Three different kinds of events might occur:

  • The automated device may not function as designed. Humans manufacture autonomous vehicles (or manufacture the robots that manufacture the vehicles), and humans are not perfect. Manufacturing defects may lead a self-braking car not to brake when it must, for example.
  • The owner of the autonomous vehicle may not have been correctly instructed about its use and / or maintenance, or may not have correctly understood information not tailored to her. Information is costly, of course. Information of “perfect” quality and quantity (for example, individualized expert tutors who would accompany owners in the vehicle) just doesn’t exist, or would be prohibitively expensive to provide. As a result, informational defects (often called “failure to warn” problems) may lead to mishandling of the vehicle, and to accidents.
  • Finally and most seriously (because it would involve an entire production run), the vehicle may have a defective design. Of course, design choices are intrinsic to all manufacturing, and every design choice will involve tradeoffs between the costs and benefits of an alternate design. There is no such thing as a “totally safe” design such a design would cost so much money that no one could afford it. And it’s not always clear which choice is “defective.” Current vehicles allow drivers to make choices, but those choices will be pre-programmed in autonomous vehicles. Two examples illustrate the problem.
    • Should vehicles be programmed to never exceed the speed limit? A reasonable driver might exceed speed limits, in emergency avoidance situations for example. What if her autonomous vehicle will not “speed” in an emergency (say, to avoid a charging moose on a rural highway) and a fatal collision results?
    • Second, what if the driver of a vehicle is presented with a split-second tragic option of hitting a large obstacle like the moose (killing the driver) or swerving onto a seemingly-empty sidewalk to avoid it (possibly endangering others but saving the driver )? Will the programmers foreclose the escape option even though the average driver might have swerved? If so, what if a fatality arises?

    How should tort law deal with these kinds of future problems? In my view, the answer follows from a sound understanding of the more sensitive elements of America’s often troubling Products Liability law:

    • In the case of manufacturing defects, manufacturers of autonomous vehicles should be liable to victims for accidents that occurred. Manufacturers have marketed a product that does not perform as advertised, and this misrepresentation provides both the moral grounds for liability and the appropriate economic incentives to perform efficient (not perfect - no one is perfect) quality control.
    • In the case of informational defects (failure-to-warn problems), manufacturers should be liable only if they were negligent (that is, if a reasonable manufacturer would have provided a better warning or better instructions). If, as seems likely, legislation or regulations stipulate what warning an autonomous vehicle should contain, compliance with such law or regulation should exclude liability, just as it should (for example) for the mandated warnings on prescription drugs.
    • In the case of design defects, the rule should again be based on negligence– was this design choice made by the manufacturer a good one, all things considered? Very important moral issues arise here (see my two moose examples above) and in some cases informed consent of risks imposed by programming would likely be required. This is where design and information defects merge, and so it is totally appropriate that the same legal standard apply in both cases. These issues could be left to properly instructed juries ’evolving notions of reasonable care under the Common Law, or could be pre-empted by regulators (who might choose to maximize social utility at the cost of precluding driving choices heretophores felt to be reasonable). Such regulation should be very carefully debated before being adopted - but if it is adopted it should bind tort tribunals until public outcry leads to its change.

    The General Aviation Revitalization Act has been mentioned as a model for legal treatment of autonomous vehicles. That statute helped rescue America’s small aircraft industry from near-death, by establishing a statute of repose (a deadline after production, beyond which time no products liability suit against an aircraft manufacturer could be filed). For a couple of reasons that model doesn’t apply here, in my opinion. First, unlike general aviation companies in the 1990’s, autonomous vehicle makers are not at death’s door - as of this writing Tesla’s market value is greater than that of Ford. Second, problems with autonomous cars are likely to spring up early, not after 25 years ’use as with Cessnas and Beechcrafts. If the Common Law is not preferred as a means to determine allocation of risks, it would be better to rely on federal pre-emption through detailed regulations covering the design and information content of vehicles. If, to the contrary, the market seen as the superior determiner of the best designs and warnings, courts will be the initial locus of decision.

    Some of us are still shifting gears ourselves, but we may be on borrowed time. A Brave New World of autonomous vehicles is on its way, and Tort law will have to adapt to it as it has adapted to new technologies in the past.


    THE TORTS OF ASSAULT AND BATTERY

    The torts of assault and battery are forms of trespass to a person. Trespass to a person is a tort as well as a criminal offense that seeks to protect civil rights or person’s dignity even if no physical harm has occurred since not every infraction of a right causes damage. This is precisely why the law of trespass does not insist on damage and one can easily be liable for trespass without necessarily causing damage for example pointing a gun at someone, raising a fist to them (torts of assault discussed here under).

    The tort of assault in ordinary language means the infliction of harm on another, however in law, assault means something completely different from ordinary understanding. An unlawful intentional placing of another in apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact with the apparent ability to carry it out constitutes assault in the law of tort. However, it is important to note that this does not cover fear of emotional distress or disturbance as some of these aspects are covered by other torts. In Uganda, to prove the tort of assault, a voluntary and affirmative act must be proven alongside intention, imminent apprehension and causation on the side of a defendant in order to convict an accused for the said tort.

    Such are the ingredients for the tort of assault

    This implies that the defendant’s conduct and words alone may not be sufficient, for instance verbal threats which are followed by immediate conduct are enough to cause an immediate apprehension of danger on the other party, hence a tort of assault. It is important to note that a physical act alone may suffice, for instance when a person cocks a gun (whether loaded or not) and points it at another.

    In principle, a tort of assault is committed provided the plaintiff is / was unaware of the fact that the gun is not loaded.On the other hand, a defendant who attempts to land a blow on the plaintiff but is restrained by a third party commits a tort of assault too (Stephens V Myers). On the same note words may in some instances negate any apprehension stemming from defendants conduct as was held in Turbeville v Savage.

    This refers to the Knowledge or the purpose to cause harm to the plaintiff. There can be substantial certainty that harm can / shall occur or it can be transferred intent. In the case of Letang v Cooper (1965), the claimant was sun bathing on grass outside a hotel near a parking lot, the defendant ran over the claimant's legs unintentionally and Court held that the proper action was negligence not trespass because of lack of intent on the defendant's side ( see also Fowler v Lanning [1959] 1 All ER 291).

    On the other hand, the doctrine of transferred intent was applied in the case of Livingstone v Minister of Defense (1984) where a claimant successfully sued for battery after being hit by a bullet that was aimed at someone else. Court held that the defendant need not intend to apply force to the claimant, as long as they intend to apply it so someone and as a result apply it to the claimant

    The plaintiff must have been aware and perceived that the actions of a tortfeasor can be dangerous. The threat must be reasonable and imminent and thus the threat of future harm cannot suffice. It is also important to note that the defendant must have the means and capacity to carry out the threat lest no tort is committed. Violent gestures by pickets at colleagues who are still working and pass by in buses is not an assault however, where the defendant has the means and capacity to commit assault but is restrained, assault is nonetheless committed since imminent apprehension is caused.

    By causation, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's voluntary act caused his / her apprehension and whether the defendant had no legal right to compel the victim carry out the act, for instance no assault is committed by an owner of the house who orders the burglar out since he / she enjoys legal right to cause the burglar to leave.

    Battery is traditionally defined as the intentional and direct application of force to another person hence an intentional harmful / offensive touching of another without justification, excuse or consent constitutes the tort of battery. The force envisaged includes light, heat, electricity et cetera.

    Since force does not require bodily contact with the aggressor as such it can be applied through agents (extensions of tortfeasor) or things such as the afore mentioned. It is important to note that the least touching of another in anger is a battery as per Holt C.J. For the tort of battery to be proved in court, ingredients of affirmative act, intention, harmful / offensive touching as well as causation must be clearly shown as a basis for cause of action.

    The affirmative act must be voluntary and intentional since an involuntary or unconscious act is not sufficient to qualify this element, for instance a blow struck by a person undergoing an epileptic fit would not amount to battery because the act itself is involuntary and lacks relevant intent .

    The relevant intention is the intention to do the act, not the intention to cause damage, why? Because trespass is actionable per se thus there is no need to prove damage. This was the instance in the case of Wilson v Pringle, where court held that the act of touching the plaintiff had to be intentional and the touching had to be hostile touching.

    The tort of battery is derived from the writ of trespass thus it (battery) must be direct / physical and there must be some form of contact with the plaintiff before a battery is committed. Contact between persons varies from violent assaults through to accidental bumps in crowded streets. In between are practical jokers, people who indulge in sexual harassment and doctors who need to treat unconscious patients, if this is so, how is a court (able) to draw a line on what is offensive and what is not? The dividing line in Wilson v Pringle was drawn at what was generally acceptable in the ordinary conduct of daily life, however, what is perfectly acceptable to one person may be totally repugnant to another. Into the Collins v Wilcock, a police officer who touches a person with the intention of restraining them, with no legal power to do so, is acting with hostile intent.

    Synonymous with the tort of assault, the plaintiff must prove that it’s the defendant who caused the harmful act to succeed in a battery suit.

    As a way of conclusion, assault precedes battery and once contact is made what was an assault initially turns to battery however, assault may occur without battery (Stephen v Myers) and this means if a situation is such that immediate physical violence clearly could be expected, there may be assault, even though violence is prevented or for some reason, it does not take place.

    The other issue to note on assault is that, if words alone cannot be assault, is it possible to assault a blind person? Not allowing words to count as an assault defeats the purpose of the tort since like physical threats, words too, create fear. It is only a matter of time before this is tested in court.

    The available defenses are consent, justification (legal / privilege) and self defense.

    In the case of Njareketa v Director Medical Services, the defendant was held liable for trespass against the appellant for failure to heed to the appellants lack of consent. Any consent given will be limited to the act for which permission is given, Nash v Sheen. In the case of doctors, in order to avoid an action for battery, a doctor must show either that consent was given for the touching, or that the touching was necessary in the best interests of the patient.

    Self defense shall suffice where reasonable force is used in defense of the plaintiff’s person, property, or another person. What amounts to self defense will be a question of fact in each case, but the basic principle is that the force used must be reasonable in proportion to the attack.

    THE TORTS OF ASSAULT AND BATTERY.

    The torts of assault and battery are forms of trespass to a person. Trespass to a person is a tort as well as a criminal offense that seeks to protect civil rights or person's dignity even if no physical harm has occurred since not every infraction of a right causes damage, This is precisely why the law of trespass does not insist on damage and one can easily be liable for trespass without necessarily causing damage for example pointing a gun at someone, raising a fist to them (torts of assault discussed hereunder)

    The tort of assault in ordinary language means the infliction of harm on another, however in law assault means something completely different from ordinary understanding. An unlawful intentional placing of another in apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact with the apparent ability to carry it out constitutes assault in the law of tort, However it is important to note that this does not cover fear emotional distress or disturbance as some of these aspects are covered by other torts. In Uganda, to prove the tort of assault, a voluntary and affirmative act must be proven alongside intention, imminent apprehension and causation on the side of a defendant in order to convict an accused for the said tort. I thus expound more on each ingredient for the tort of assault

    This implies that the defendant’s conduct and words alone may not be sufficient, for instance verbal threats which are followed by immediate conduct are enough to cause an immediate apprehension of danger on the other party, hence a tort of assault. It is important to note that a physical act alone may suffice for instance when a person cocks a gun (whether loaded or not) and points it at another.

    In principle, a tort of assault is committed provided the plaintiff is / was unaware of the fact that the gun is not loaded.On the other hand, a defendant who attempts to land a blow on the plaintiff but is restrained by a third party commits a tort of assault too. (Stephens V Myers). On the same note words may in some instances negate any apprehension stemming from defendants conduct as was held in Turbeville v Savage.

    This refers to the Knowledge or the purpose to cause harm to the plaintiff. There can be substantial certainty that harm can / shall occur or it can be transferred intent. In the case of Letang v Cooper (1965), the claimant was sun bathing on grass outside a hotel near a parking lot, the defendant ran over the claimant’s legs unintentionally and Court held that the proper action was negligence not trespass because of lack of intent on the side of the defendant (see also Fowler v Lanning [1959] 1 All ER 291).

    On the other hand, the doctrine of transferred intent was applied in the case of Livingstone v Minister of Defence (1984) where a claimant successfully sued for battery after being hit by a bullet that was aimed at someone else. Court held that the defendant need not intend to apply force to the claimant, as long as they intend to apply it so someone and as a result apply it to the claimant

    The plaintiff must have been aware and perceived that the actions of a tortfeasor can be dangerous. The threat must be reasonable and imminent and thus threat of future harm cannot suffice. It is also important to note that the defendant must have the means and capacity to carry out the threat lest no tort is committed. Violent gestures by pickets at colleagues who are still working and pass by in buses is not an assault however, where the defendant has the means and capacity to commit assault but is restrained, assault is nonetheless committed since imminent apprehension is caused.

    By causation, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s voluntary act caused his/her apprehension and whether the defendant had no legal right to compel the victim carry out the act, for instance no assault is committed by an owner of the house who orders the burglar out since he/she enjoys legal right to cause the burglar to leave.

    Battery is traditionally defined as the intentional and direct application of force to another person hence an intentional harmful/offensive touching of another without justification, excuse or consent constitutes the tort of battery. The force envisaged includes light, heat, electricity… et cetera, since force does not require bodily contact with the aggressor as such it can be applied through agents (extensions of tortfeasor) or things such as the afore mentioned. It is important to note that the least touching of another in anger is a battery as per Holt C.J. For the tort of battery to be proved in court, ingredients of affirmative act, intention, harmful/offensive touching as well as causation must be clearly shown as a basis for cause of action.

    The affirmative act must be voluntary and intentional since an involuntary or unconscious act is not sufficient to qualify this element, for instance a blow struck by a person undergoing an epileptic fit would not amount to battery because the act in itself is involuntary and lacks relevant intent. The relevant intention is the intention to do the act, not the intention to cause damage, why?

    Because trespass is actionable per se thus there no need to prove damage. This was the instance in the case of Wilson v Pringle, where court held that the act of touching the plaintiff had to be intentional and the touching had to be hostile touching.

    The tort of battery is derived from the writ of trespass thus it (battery) must be direct/ physical and there must be some form of contact with the plaintiff before a battery is committed. Contact between persons varies from violent assaults through to accidental bumps in crowded streets. In between are practical jokers, people who indulge in sexual harassment and doctors who need to treat unconscious patients, if this is so, how is a court (able) to draw a line on what is offensive and what is not?

    The dividing line in Wilson v Pringle was drawn at what was generally acceptable in the ordinary conduct of daily life, however, what is perfectly acceptable to one person may be totally repugnant to another. Into the Collins v Wilcock, a police officer who touches a person with the intention of restraining them, with no legal power to do so, is acting with hostile intent.

    Synonymous to the tort of assault, the plaintiff must prove that it’s the defendant who caused the harmful act to succeed in a suit of battery.

    As a way of conclusion, assault precedes battery and once contact is made what was an assault initially turns to battery however, assault may occur without battery (Stephen v Myers) and this means if a situation is such that immediate physical violence clearly could be expected, there may be assault, even though violence is prevented or for some reason, it does not take place.

    The other issue to note on assault is that, if words alone cannot be assault, is it possible to assault a blind person? Not allowing words to count as an assault defeats the purpose of the tort since like physical threats, words too, create fear. It is only a matter of time before this is tested in court.

    The available defences are consent, justification (legal/privilege) and self defence.

    In the case of Njareketa v Director Medical Services, the defendant was held liable for trespass against the appellant for failure to heed to the appellants lack of consent. Any consent given will be limited to the act for which permission is given, Nash v Sheen. In the case of doctors, in order to avoid an action for battery, a doctor must show either that consent was given for the touching, or that the touching was necessary in the best interests of the patient.

    Self defence shall suffice where reasonable force is used in defence of the plaintiff’s person, property, or another person. What amounts to self defence will be a question of fact in each case, but the basic principle is that the force used must be reasonable in proportion to the attack.


    La mulți ani, Jerry Seinfeld! 19 Citate Seinfeld pentru a-ți trăi viața

    Zilele de naștere sunt doar simbolice pentru modul în care a trecut un alt an și cât de puțin am crescut, Jerry Seinfeld Caracterul lui odata spus într-un episod din Emisiunea despre nimic. Indiferent cât de disperați suntem că într-o zi va apărea un sine mai bun, cu fiecare licărire a lumânărilor de pe tort, știm că nu trebuie să fie - că pentru restul vieților noastre triste, nenorocite și jalnice, acesta este cine suntem sfarsitul amar. Inevitabil, irevocabil. La mulți ani ? Nici un astfel de lucru.

    In regula, atunci! Ajungem de unde vine (poate?), Dar sperăm că realitatea viaţă Jerry Seinfeld nu se deranjează să-i dorim la mulți ani. Actorul împlinește 63 de ani pe 29 aprilie 2017.

    În cinstea zilei sale de naștere, am adunat câteva dintre preferatele noastre Seinfeld citate despre viață, moarte și îmbrățișarea incompetenței.

    1. Jerry: Sondajele arată că frica nr. 1 față de americani este vorbirea în public. Nr. 2 este moartea. Moartea este numărul 2. Asta înseamnă că la o înmormântare, americanul obișnuit ar prefera să fie în sicriu decât să facă elogiul.

    Two. Kramer: Îți pierzi viața.
    George: Eu nu sunt. Ceea ce voi numiți irosire, eu numesc viață. Îmi trăiesc viața.

    3. George: Jerry, nu uita, nu este o minciună dacă o crezi.


    La mulți ani, Jason Alexander! Cele mai amuzante citate ale lui George Costanza

    Seinfeld Citate - Parade 'src =' https: //parade.com/509609/lindsaylowe/happy-birthday-jason-alexander-george-costanzas-funniest-seinfeld-quotes/embed/#? Secret = MMyGI12OT6 'margin margine>

    Four. Jerry: Pentru mine, chestia despre petreceri de ziua de naștere este că prima petrecere de naștere pe care o aveți și ultima petrecere de aniversare pe care o aveți sunt de fapt destul de asemănătoare. Știi, stai cam acolo . ești cea mai puțin emoționată persoană la petrecere. Nici nu îți dai seama că există o petrecere.

    5. Jerry: Vezi, Elaine, cheia pentru a mânca o prăjitură alb-negru este că vrei să iei niște negru și ceva alb în fiecare mușcătură. Nimic nu se amestecă mai bine decât vanilia și ciocolata. Și totuși, într-un fel, armonia rasială ne eludă. Dacă oamenii ar privi doar cookie-ul, toate problemele noastre ar fi rezolvate.

    6. Jerry: Ah, ești nebun.
    Kramer: Sunt eu? Sau sunt atât de sănătos încât tocmai ți-ai suflat mintea?

    7. George: Voi adulmeca o afacere. Am un al șaselea simț.
    Jerry: Ieftinitatea nu este un sens.

    8. George: Cine cumpără o umbrelă, oricum? Le puteți obține gratuit la cafeneaua din cutii de metal.
    Jerry: Acestea aparțin oamenilor.

    9. Kramer (prăjire): Iată cum să te simți bine tot timpul.

    10. Kramer: Spuneți că ați avut un mare interviu de muncă și că sunteți puțin nervos. Ei bine, aruncă înapoi câteva fotografii de Hennigans și vei fi la fel de slăbit ca o gâscă și gata să te rostogolești în cel mai scurt timp. Și pentru că este inodor, de ce, va fi micul nostru secret.

    unsprezece. George: Sunt deranjat, sunt deprimat, sunt inadecvat, am totul!

    12. Jerry: Scorţişoară. Ar trebui să fie pe mese în restaurante împreună cu sare și piper. Oricând cineva spune: „Ooh, este atât de bun, ce-i în asta?”, Răspunsul revine invariabil, „Scorțișoară.” Scorțișoară. Iar si iar.

    13. Jerry: Ești sigur că vrei să te căsătorești? Adică, este o mare schimbare de viață.
    Elaine: Jerry, sunt 3 dimineața și mă lupt cu cocoșii. La ce mă agăț?

    Știți cu adevărat trivia dvs. Seinfeld?

    Seinfeld Trivia? - Parade 'src =' https: //parade.com/317597/nancyberk/do-you-really-know-your-seinfeld-trivia/embed/#? Secret = 7MSJ3PIKtP 'margin margine>

    14. Jerry: Elaine, îți pasă mereu când se întâlnește o fostă iubită. Nu vrei să fie cineva pe care îl cunoști și nu vrei să fie cineva mai bun decât tine. În timp ce acesta din urmă este în mod evident imposibil, primul se aplică în continuare.

    cincisprezece. George: Ei bine, cred că va trebui doar să mă ridic, să mă prăfuiesc și să mă arunc din nou.

    16. Jerry: Kramer, aceste baloane nu vor rămâne umplute până Ani noi !
    Kramer: Ei bine, acestea nu sunt pentru Anul Nou. Acestea sunt baloanele mele de zi cu zi.

    17. Kramer: Om, este uman să fii mișcat de un parfum.

    18. Jerry: Nu ai sunat bolnav ieri?
    George:
    Hei, lucrez pentru Kruger Industrial Smoothing. Nu ne pasă . și se vede.

    19. Jerry: Deci vrei să ieși într-un foc final de incompetență?
    George:
    Flacăra aprinsă.


    President Trump’s Tort Reform

    President Trump’s budget for Fiscal Year 2018 proposes a thoroughgoing reform of our medical malpractice system [Executive Office of the President of the United States, Major Savings and Reforms, Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2018, at 114 (2017) (hereinafter, the “Budget”)]. The reform’s stated goals are “[to] reduce defensive medicine … limit liability, reduce provider burden, promote evidence-based practices, and strengthen the physician-patient relationship.”

    To achieve these goals, the reform will introduce the following measures:

    • a cap on non-economic damage awards of $250,000 (adjustable to inflation)
    • a three-year statute of limitations
    • allowing courts to modify attorney’s fee arrangements
    • abolition of the “collateral source” rule (to allow judges and jurors to hear evidence of the plaintiff’s income from other sources such as workers’ compensation and insurance)
    • creating a safe harbor for clinicians who follow evidence-based clinical-practice guidelines.

    The Trump administration is also planning to authorize the Secretary of Health and Human Services “to provide guidance to States to create expert panels and administrative health care tribunals to review medical liability cases.” The Budget does not specify the nature of the contemplated federal guidance and the powers that the expert panels and tribunals will receive. For that reason, I will not examine this reform item here.

    The Budget does not specify the ways in which the administration is planning to implement the above-mentioned reforms. The options are:

    1. Direct congressional legislation.
    2. A model Act that states will be encouraged to adopt. For example, the federal government will offer special funding to states that implement its model Act while denying it to the non-compliant states.
    3. Model legislation combined with financial penalties for the noncompliant states. For example, the federal government may decide to reduce its participation in the non-compliant states’ expenditures on programs such as Medicaid.

    Among these options, only (1) and (2) are constitutionally and politically viable. The third option will require Congress to pass a statute that will be opposed not only by many democrats, but also by republican supporters of state rights. More fundamentally, such legislation will violate the anti-commandeering doctrine of the Tenth Amendment and federalism, and will thus be unconstitutional. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). My examination of the proposed reforms therefore focuses only on Options (1) and (2).

    DIRECT CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION

    The Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art I, § 8, clearly authorizes Congress to carry out nationwide reforms of medical liability to reduce the costs and increase the affordability of medical care (see, e.g., Katherine Shaw & Alex Stein, Abortion, Informed Consent, and Regulatory Spillover, 92 Ind. L.J. 1, 47-52 (2016)). The proposed reforms, nonetheless, would still face serious constitutional challenges. Some of those reforms are also ill-suited to promote their own goals.

    (1) THE $250,000 CAP ON NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES

    The proposed cap on statutory damages replicates California’s $250,000 cap introduced in 1975 by the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act. In today’s terms, the cap amount should be around $1.1M, but California’s Proposition 46 that purported to make this inflation-based adjustment was defeated in a November 2014 referendum.

    The $250,000 cap is unconscionably low, especially for victims in cases of wrongful death and catastrophic injury. Under any plausible criterion, non-economic damages—pain and suffering, diminished enjoyment of life, and loss of consortium—far exceed $250,000. The proposed cap will also produce disturbing regressive effect: it will disproportionately tax middle class and low-income victims by reducing their total recovery amounts at a much higher rate relative to medical malpractice victims with high-paying jobs (who will receive much higher amounts of compensation for their economic losses). This regressive effect will be further exacerbated by the fact that middle-class and low-income patients are also more likely to become victims of medical malpractice than wealthy patients, given that wealthy patients purchase for themselves and for their families better medical care.

    The proposed cap also discriminates between medical malpractice victims and other tort victims, to whom the jury can award any compensation for non-economic harms that falls within reason.

    For these reasons, the cap will face an equal protection challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment. To withstand this challenge, the government must have a demonstrable legitimate interest in the nationwide cap. Specifically, the cap’s introduction must have the potential for reducing defensive medicine and the costs of medical care. This “legitimate interest” claim would not be easy to sustain in light of its recent repudiation in McCall v. United States, 134 So.3d 894 (Fla. 2014)—a decision that voided Florida’s $1M cap on non-economic damages recoverable in connection with a malpractice victim’s death. For my analysis of this decision, see here. The fact that a doctor will not pay more than $250,000 in non-economic damages will not reduce her incentive to practice defensive medicine, given that she still stands to pay substantial amounts of compensation to future plaintiffs and that her malpractice liability will be recorded at the National Practitioner Databank (for problems created by this blacklisting, see here).

    If the Trump administration is right about doctors’ fear of frivolous suits and excessive liability, this problem should be tackled head-on. Instead of capping plaintiffs’ recovery for non-economic damages, the legal system should put in place clear definitions of medical malpractice and adequate care that will shield doctors from liability in all cases in which they provide customary care by treating patients according to the practices and protocols established by the medical profession. Many states have already implemented this measure and virtually eliminated frivolous lawsuits: see Alex Stein, Toward a Theory of Medical Malpractice, 97 Iowa L. Rev. 1201, 1209-15 (2012).

    Furthermore, studies cited with approval in the McCall decision show that the cost of medical liability insurance is not affected by caps on recoverable non-economic damages. An increase in this cost over the past three decades was brought about by inflation and the vagaries of the market. A decrease in the level of compensation for malpractice victims’ non-economic harms therefore will not make it cheaper for doctors to purchase liability insurance. Narrowing the scope of physicians’ malpractice liability is far more likely to achieve this result. See Stein id., at 1209-15, 1256-57.

    The administration will also have to choose the appropriate mechanism for implementing its cap. This mechanism may come in the form of a simple jury instruction not to award the plaintiff non-economic damages that exceed $250,000. This instruction would often be ineffectual. When jurors come to believe that the victim’s compensation is unreasonably low, they might boost the victim’s economic recovery to bring her total compensation award closer to the figure they believe is right. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damages Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 391 (2005).

    For that reason, the administration might prefer the more common mechanism that allows jurors to come up with any estimate of the plaintiff’s non-economic damage while mandating that judges reduce this estimate whenever it exceeds the maximal amount permitted by the statutory cap. See, e.g., Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem’l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895, 902, 908 (Ill. 2010) (explaining that under Illinois statute that caps medical malpractice victims’ non-economic recovery at $1M, “the court is required to override the jury’s deliberative process and reduce any non-economic damages in excess of the statutory cap, irrespective of the particular facts and circumstances, and without the plaintiff’s consent” and holding that this provision “effects an unconstitutional legislative remittitur” that violates separation of powers).

    This mechanism, however, interferes with trial management in state courts. As such, it can hardly be forced upon states by congressional legislation. As Laurence Tribe put it in his testimony before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, “For Congress directly to regulate the procedures used by state courts in adjudicating state-law tort claims … would raise serious questions under the Tenth Amendment and principles of federalism.” Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 Yale L.J. 947, 950-51 & n.13 (2001).

    (2) STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

    The proposed statute of limitations brings about no change whatsoever. In fact, most state laws impose a 2 year limitations period.

    (3) REGULATING ATTORNEY FEES

    Authorizing courts to modify the conventional contingent-fee arrangement that entitles the attorney to collect one-third from the plaintiffs award (plus expenditures) is unlikely to promote the reform’s goals. The reformers will do well to learn from New York’s experience with its Judiciary Law § 474-a—a provision that set up an elaborate sliding-scale fee system for attorneys in actions for medical malpractice, while allowing courts to increase the attorney’s compensation in special cases. This experience shows no decline in the filings of medical malpractice suits. At the same time, it indicates that the system has created different conflicts of interest between attorneys and clients while limiting the victim’s ability to hire the best attorney for prosecuting her suit against the physician. See Senate Bill S554 to repeal Judiciary Law § 474-a (noting, inter alia, that attorneys representing plaintiffs in medical malpractice suits have an incentive to strike a cheap early settlement).

    (4) DOING AWAY WITH THE “COLLATERAL SOURCE” RULE

    The collateral source rule holds that a wrongdoer cannot benefit from payments a victim receives from other sources, such as insurance companies, government agencies, and private donors. Those payments belong to the victim alone. Consequently, abolishing this rule would transfer the victim’s money to the wrongdoer. This transfer is unfair and may also weaken the physicians’ incentive to avoid malpractice. See Alex Stein, The Domain of Torts, 117 Colum. L. Rev. 535, 597-98 (2017). Moreover, abolition of the collateral source rule may violate equal protection as well (compare Thompson v. KFB Insurance Co., 850 P.2d 773 (Kan. 1993) (equal protection violated) with Barme v. Wood, 689 P.2d 446 (Cal. 1984) (equal protection not violated)).

    (5) CLINICAL-PRACTICE GUIDELINES AS A SAFE HARBOR

    This part of the reform will introduce a statutory provision that incentivizes physicians to treat patients in accordance with clinical practice guidelines. Physicians who follow those guidelines will receive immunity from malpractice liability. The reformers thus favor a switch from the traditional medicine with its patient-specific applications of medical science to what has become known as “evidence-based medicine”—an evolving discipline that translates clinical experience into statistical data to formulate practice guidelines for physicians. Whether this switch will benefit patients is far from clear. Many doctors believe—for good reasons—that basic science that investigates actual causes and effects is more reliable than statistics and that their patient-specific observations and intuitions will deliver patients a better treatment than the “one size fits all” approach. See L. Jonathan Cohen, Bayesianism Versus Baconianism in the Evaluation of Medical Diagnoses, 31 Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 45 (1980).

    Be that as it may, a switch to evidence-based medicine and clinical practice guidelines will create a serious problem for physicians, which might offset the advantages of the new immunity against suit. This switch will not change the nature of the traditional medicine as a body of knowledge that identifies successful methods of patient care. The doctors’ informed-consent requirements consequently will include the duty to inform the patient about the traditional treatment options that go beyond the guidelines and the guidelines’ statistics. As a result, the doctor would have to engage in a rather complicated informed-consent dialogue with her patient and face greater exposure to a suit for violating the patient’s right to be informed. To forestall this problem, the reformers would have to allow physicians not to inform patients about treatment options other than those included in the guidelines, but this freedom to misinform is not a viable possibility from both social standpoint and the medical profession’s point of view.

    STATE LEGISLATION (MOTIVATED BY FEDERAL FUNDING)

    This reform option has special implications for the proposed damage cap. As far as other measures are concerned, it will bring about the same advantages and face the same problems as a federal statute.

    Having the states’ legislative assemblies pass a statute that caps medical malpractice victims’ non-economic damages at $250,000 will forestall the Tenth Amendment challenge. Yet, it will give rise to two other constitutional problems. The statutory cap might be in violation of the constitutional right to a jury trial and the separation of powers principle. See Lebron, id. Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctr., 376 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. banc 2012) (voiding Missouri’s cap on non-economic damages resulting from medical malpractice for violating Article I, § 22(a) of the state’s constitution under which “the right of a trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate”). This violation is virtually certain to occur if the most effective and consequently most prevalent cap model, known as a “statutory remittitur,” is adopted. Under this model, the judge instructs jurors to assess the plaintiff’s non-economic and economic damage separately from one another without informing them about the cap. Subsequently, if the jurors return an assessment of the plaintiff’s non-economic damage that exceeds $250,000, the judge will bring it down to that amount. This model is unlikely to pass constitutional muster, as explained in Leebron, Watts, and several other state Supreme Court decisions.

    The cap will also conflict with the constitutional provisions that entrench the citizen’s right to sue and recover full compensation for personal injury and wrongful death. These entrenchments protect the right to sue and recover compensation as it was on the day of the constitution’s ratification, and they are present in many state constitutions. See, e.g., Or. Const., Art. I, § 10 (entrenching “every man’s” right to “remedy by due course of law for injury done him in his person, property, or reputation”) Tenn. Const., § 17 (“…every man, for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial, or delay.”) Utah Const., Art. XVI, § 5 (“The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in death, shall never be abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory limitation, except in cases where compensation for injuries resulting in death is provided for by law.”) N.Y. Const. Art. I, § 16 (“The right of action now existing to recover damages for injuries resulting in death, shall never be abrogated and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory limitation.”).

    Courts have interpreted these entrenchments as a complete ban on damage caps: see Smith v. United States, 356 P.3d 1249 (Utah 2015) Klutschkowski v. Oregon Medical Group, 311 P.3d 461 (Or. 2013). In Horton v. Oregon Health and Science University, 376 P.3d 998, 1028 (Or. 2016), the Oregon Supreme Court has slightly relaxed this approach when it ruled that “[w]hen the legislature does not limit the duty that a defendant owes a plaintiff but does limit the size or nature of the remedy, the legislative remedy need not restore all the damages that the plaintiff sustained to pass constitutional muster, but a remedy that is only a paltry fraction of the damages that the plaintiff sustained will unlikely be sufficient.” (citations omitted). Under this criterion, capping noneconomic damages for all types of victims of medical malpractice would still be unconstitutional. For my discussions of these developments, see here, here, here, and here.

    For all these reasons, the medical malpractice reform contemplated by the Trump administration is unlikely to take hold and achieve its goals. The reformers should redirect their attention from remedies, attorney fees and evidence-based medicine to the definitions of medical malpractice and adequate care. Aligning these definitions with the medical profession’s customs, practices and protocols and ensuring that courts do not deviate from these definitions will go a long way toward creating a fair and socially beneficial tradeoff between patients’ rights and doctors’ protection against unmeritorious suits.


    Video: #arxiv2017. Muxammadali rafiqasiga tort yidirish marosimi (January 2022).